Abstract. The selective decommitment problem can be described as follows: assume that an adversary receives a number of commitments and then may request openings of, say, half of them. Do the unopened commitments remain secure? Although this question arose more than twenty years ago, no satisfactory answer could be presented so far. We answer the question in several ways:
Introduction
Consider an adversary A that observes ciphertexts sent among parties in a multi-party cryptographic protocol. At some point, A may decide, based on the information he already observed, to corrupt, say, half of the parties. By this, A learns the secret keys of these parties, which allows him to open some of the observed ciphertexts. The question is: do the unopened ciphertexts remain secure? Since most encryption schemes actually constitute commitments to the respective messages, we can rephrase the question as what is known as the selective decommitment problem: assume that A receives a number of commitments and then may request openings of half of them. Do the unopened commitments remain secure? According to Dwork et al. [22] , this question arose already more than twenty years ago in the context of Byzantine agreement, but it is still relatively poorly understood. In particular, standard cryptographic techniques (e.g., guessing which commitments are opened, or hybrid arguments) fail to show that "ordinary" commitment security against a static adversary guarantees security under selective openings. 1 Even worse: no commitment scheme is known to be secure under selective openings.
Previous Work
The selective decommitment problem arises in particular in the encryption situation described above and hence was recognized and mentioned in a number of works before (e.g., [4, 11, 12, 14, 18] ). However, these works solved the problem by using (and, in fact, inventing) noncommitting encryption, which circumvents the underlying commitment problem. In the zero-knowledge setting, Gennaro and Micali [25] notice a selective decommitment problem and circumvent it by adapting the distribution of the messages committed to. Similarly, a number of works (e.g., Dolev et al. [21] , Prabhakaran et al. [40] in the context of zero-knowledge) use "cut-and-choose" techniques on committed values, which is a specific form of selective opening. These works can prove security by using specific properties of the distributions of the committed values (e.g., the fact that the unopened values, conditioned on the opened values, are still uniformly distributed).
Dwork et al. [22] is, to the best of our knowledge, the only previous work that explicitly studies the selective decommitment problem. They prove that a commitment scheme which is secure under selective openings would have interesting applications. In particular, they show that a (noninteractive) commitment scheme that is secure under selective openings gives rise to a 3-round zero-knowledge proof system for NP with negligible soundness error. They proceed to give positive results for substantially relaxed selective decommitment problems (essentially, they prove security when standard techniques can be applied, i.e., when the set of opened commitments can be guessed, or when the messages are independent). However, they leave open the question whether commitment schemes secure under (general) selective openings exist.
From Goldreich and Krawczyk [27] it is known that 3-round black-box zeroknowledge proof systems exist only for languages in BPP. Let us denote a commitment scheme that, when plugged into the construction of [22] , gives rise to a black-box zeroknowledge proof system, as ZK-black-box. Note that a noninteractive ZK-black-box commitment scheme gives rise to a 3-round black-box zero-knowledge proof system. Thus, combining the results of [27] and [22] shows that no noninteractive ZK-blackbox commitment schemes exist (or NP ⊆ BPP). That is, [22, 27] essentially show that no noninteractive commitment scheme exists that is secure under selective openings and for which the simulator is constructed in a black-box way from the adversary (on the commitment security). Jumping ahead, one of our results shows that no noninteractive commitment scheme exists that is secure under selective openings and uses the computational assumption in a black-box way. These are both negative but orthogonal statements. Indeed, it is conceivable that a security reduction uses specific, non-blackbox properties of the adversary (e.g., it is common in reductions to explicitly make use of the adversary's complexity bounds), but neither scheme nor reduction uses specifics (like the code) of the underlying primitive.
Black-box impossibility results from generic assumptions have been derived by Dodis et al. [20] . They show that the security of full-domain hash signatures [5] cannot be proved using a black-box reduction to any hardness assumption that is satisfied by a random permutation. Concurrently to and independently from our work, Haitner and Holenstein [29] developed a framework to prove impossibility of black-box reductions from any computational assumption. While their formalism is very similar to ours (e.g., their definition of a "cryptographic game" matches our definition of a "security property"), they apply it to an entirely different problem. Namely, [29] prove black-box impossibility of encryption schemes secure in the presence of key-dependent messages.
Our Work We answer the selective decommitment problem in several ways. First, we consider what happens if "security of the unopened commitments" means that we require the existence of a simulator S such that S essentially achieves what A does, only without seeing the unopened commitments in the first place. We call a commitment scheme that is secure in this sense simulatable under selective openings. We show that no noninteractive or perfectly binding commitment scheme can be proved simulatable under selective openings using black-box reductions to standard assumptions. However, we also show how to construct commitment schemes that are simulatable under selective openings, under the assumption that one-way permutations exist. Our construction uses non-black-box techniques (i.e., zero-knowledge proofs) and interaction to circumvent our impossibility results. This solves an important open problem from Dwork et al. [22] : our schemes are the first commitment schemes provably secure under selective openings.
We proceed to consider what happens if "security" means that A cannot distinguish the messages inside the unopened commitments from independent messages (where "independent" can of course only mean "independent, conditioned on the already opened messages"). We call a commitment scheme that is secure in this sense indistinguishable under selective openings. We show that no perfectly binding commitment scheme (interactive or not) can be proved indistinguishable under selective openings, via blackbox reductions from standard assumptions. However, we also show that all statistically hiding commitment schemes are indistinguishable under selective openings.
Technically, we derive black-box impossibility results in the style of Impagliazzo and Rudich [35] , but we can derive stronger claims, similar to Dodis et al. [20] . Concretely, we prove impossibility via ∀∃semi-black-box proofs from any computational assumption that can be formalized as an oracle X and a corresponding security property P which the oracle satisfies. For instance, to model one-way permutations, X could be a truly random permutation, and P could be the one-way game in which a PPT adversary tries to invert a random image. We emphasize that, somewhat surprisingly, our impossibility claim holds even if P models security under selective openings. In that case, however, a reduction will necessarily be non-black-box, see Appendix A for a discussion.
Applications We apply our results to the adaptively secure encryption example mentioned in the beginning and to a special class of interactive proof systems. First, we comment that an adaptively secure encryption scheme must be noncommitting or rely on nonstandard techniques. Namely, whenever a committing (i.e., ciphertexts commit to messages) encryption scheme is adaptively secure, then it also is, interpreted as a (noninteractive) commitment scheme, simulatable under selective openings. Our impossibility results show that hence, a committing encryption scheme cannot be proved adaptively secure via black-box reductions from standard assumptions.
Second, we apply our results to "commit-choose-open" (CCO) style interactive proof systems such as the graph 3-coloring protocol G3C from Goldreich et al. [28] . Refining the techniques of Dwork et al. [22] , we prove that any CCO protocol becomes zero-knowledge under parallel composition, when implemented with a commitment scheme which is simulatable under selective openings. In particular, our (interactive, but constant-round) commitment scheme enables the parallel composability of G3C. We also show that a CCO protocol becomes witness-indistinguishable, even under parallel composition, when implemented with a commitment scheme which is indistinguishable under selective openings. This shows the usefulness of our indistinguishability-based security definition as a reasonable fallback.
Organization After fixing some notation in Sect. 2, we present in Sect. 3 our possibility and impossibility results for the simulation-based security definition of Dwork et al. [22] . We give an indistinguishability-based security definition, along with possibility and impossibility results in Sect. 4. In Sects. 5 and 6, we consider applications of our results to encryption and interactive proof systems. In Appendix A, we discuss the role of the computational assumption in our impossibility results.
Publication Note and Follow-Up Work
This work constitutes the full version of one part of the Eurocrypt 2009 paper "Possibility and impossibility results for encryption and commitment secure under selective opening" by Bellare et al. [7] . The paper [7] is the merge of two Eurocrypt submissions on the topic of security under selective openings. One submission (by Bellare and Yilek) treated the encryption case, while the other (by Hofheinz) treated the commitment case. The present work is the full version of the latter submission.
Very recently, Hemenway and Ostrovsky [32] have used and improved on the results of [7] . Hemenway and Ostrovsky provide efficient encryption schemes secure under selective openings, along with a generic construction to achieve security even under chosen-ciphertext attacks. They also show that a special type of randomized one-way functions give rise to noninteractive commitment schemes that are secure under selective openings. Their results do not contradict our impossibility results since they consider a trusted setup of public parameters. (In other words, commitments are performed and checked relative to ideally chosen public parameters.) A more detailed discussion of the ideas of [7, 32] and of our impossibility results in the context of trusted setup information can be found in Sect. 5.
Preliminaries
Notation Throughout the paper, k ∈ N denotes a security parameter. With growing k, attacks should be become harder, but we also allow schemes to be of complexity which is polynomial in k. A PPT algorithm/machine is a probabilistic algorithm/machine which runs in time polynomial in k. While an algorithm is stateless, a machine maintains a state across activations. A function f = f (k) is called negligible if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial. That is, f is negligible iff ∀c ∃k 0 ∀k > k 0 : |f (k)| < k −c . If f is not negligible, we call f nonnegligible. We say that f is overwhelming iff 1 − f is negligible. We write [n] := {1, . . . , n}. If M = (M i ) i is an indexed set, then we write M I := (M i ) i∈I . We denote the empty (bit-)string by .
Commitment Schemes
Definition 1 (Commitment scheme). For a pair of PPT machines Com = (S, R) and a machine A, consider the following experiments:
In this, A, S denotes the output of A after interacting with S, and R, A denotes the output of R after interacting with A. We say that Com is a commitment scheme iff the following holds: Definition 2 (Noninteractive commitment scheme). A noninteractive commitment scheme is a commitment scheme Com = (S, R) in which both commit and opening phases consist of only one message sent from S to R. We can treat a noninteractive commitment scheme as a pair of algorithms rather than machines. Namely, we write (com, dec) ← S(M) shorthand for the commit message com and opening message dec sent by S on input M. We also denote by M ← R(com, dec) the final output of R upon receiving com in the commit phase and dec in the opening phase.
Note that perfectly binding implies that any commitment can only be opened to at most one value M. Perfectly binding (noninteractive) commitment schemes can be achieved from any one-way permutation (e.g., Blum [8] ). On the other hand, statistically hiding implies that for any M 0 , M 1 ∈ {0, 1} k , the statistical distance between the respective views of the receiver in the commit phase is negligible. One-way functions suffice to implement statistically hiding (interactive) commitment schemes (Haitner and Reingold [30] ), but there are certain lower bounds for the communication complexity of such constructions (Wee et al. [45] , Haitner et al. [31] ). However, if we assume the existence of (families of) collision-resistant hash functions, then even constant-round statistically hiding commitment schemes exist (Damgård et al. [19] , Naor and Yung [38] ).
Interactive Argument Systems and Zero-Knowledge We recall some basic definitions concerning interactive argument systems, mostly following Goldreich [26] . Definition 3 (Interactive proof/argument system). An interactive proof system for a language L with witness relation R is a pair of PPT machines IP = (P, V) such that the following holds:
Completeness. For every family (x k , w k ) k∈N such that R(x k , w k ) for all k and |x k | is polynomial in k, we have that the probability for V(x k ) to output 1 after interacting with P(x k , w k ) is at least 2/3. Soundness. For every machine P * and every family (x k , z k ) k∈N such that |x k | = k and x k ∈ L for all k, we have that the probability for V(x k ) to output 1 after interacting with P * (x k , z k ) is at most 1/3.
If the soundness condition holds for all PPT machines P * (but not necessarily for all unbounded P * ), then IP is an interactive argument system. We say that IP enjoys perfect completeness if V always outputs 1 in the completeness condition. Furthermore, IP has negligible soundness error if V outputs 1 only with negligible probability in the soundness condition.
Definition 4 (Zero-knowledge). Let IP = (P, V) be an interactive proof or argument system for language L with witness relation R. IP is zero-knowledge if for every PPT machine V * , there exists a PPT machine S * such that for all sequences (x, w) = (x k , w k ) k∈N with R(x k , w k ) for all k and |x k | polynomial in k, for all PPT machines D, and all auxiliary inputs
denotes the transcript of the interaction between the prover P and V * .
Most known interactive proof systems achieve perfect completeness. Conversely, most systems do not enjoy a negligible soundness error "by nature"; their soundness has to be amplified via repetition, e.g., via sequential or concurrent composition. Thus, it is important to consider the concurrent composition of an interactive argument system:
Definition 5 (Concurrent zero-knowledge). Let IP = (P, V) be an interactive proof or argument system for language L with witness relation R. IP is zero-knowledge under concurrent composition iff for every polynomial n = n(k) and PPT machine V * , there exists a PPT machine S * such that for all sequences (x, w)
denotes the transcript of the interaction between n copies of the prover P (with the respective inputs (x i,k , w i,k ) for i = 1, . . . , n) on the one hand and V * on the other hand.
There exist interactive proof systems (with perfect completeness and negligible soundness error) that achieve Definition 5 for arbitrary NP-languages if one-way permutations exist (e.g., Richardson and Kilian [42] ; see also [1, 3, 13, 23, 36] for similar results in related settings). If we assume the existence of (families of) collision-resistant hash functions, then there even exist constant-round interactive proof systems that achieve a bounded version of Definition 5 in which the number of concurrent instances is fixed in advance (Barak [1] , Barak and Goldreich [2] ). 2 Black-box Reductions Reingold et al. [41] give an excellent overview and classification of black-box reductions. We recall some of their definitions which are important for our case. A primitive P = (F P , R P ) is a set F P of functions f : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} * along with a relation R over pairs (f, A), where f ∈ F P , and A is a machine. We say that f is an implementation of P iff f ∈ F P . Furthermore, f is an efficient implementation of P iff f ∈ F P and f can be computed by a PPT machine. A machine A P-breaks f ∈ F P iff R P (f, A). A primitive P exists if there is an efficient implementation f ∈ F P such that no PPT machine P-breaks f . A primitive P exists relative to an oracle B iff there exists an implementation f ∈ F P which is computable by a PPT machine with access to B such that no PPT machine with access to B P-breaks f .
Definition 6 (Relativizing reduction)
. There exists a relativizing reduction from a primitive P = (F P , R P ) to a primitive Q = (F Q , R Q ) iff for every oracle B, the following holds: if Q exists relative to B, then so does P.
Definition 7 (∀∃semi-black-box reduction). There exists a ∀∃semi-black-box reduction from a primitive P = (F P , R P ) to a primitive Q = (F Q , R Q ) iff for every implementation f ∈ F Q , there exists a PPT machine G such that G f ∈ F P , and the following holds: if there exists a PPT machine A such that A f P-breaks G f , then there exists a PPT machine S such that S f Q-breaks f .
It can be seen that if a relativizing reduction exists, then so does a ∀∃semi-black-box reduction. The converse is true when Q "allows embedding," which essentially means that additional oracles can be embedded into Q without destroying its functionality (see Reingold et al. [41] , Definition 3.4 and Theorem 3.5 and Simon [44] ). Below we will prove impossibility of relativizing reductions between certain primitives, which also proves impossibility of ∀∃semi-black-box reductions, since the corresponding primitives Q allow embedding.
A Simulation-Based Definition
Consider the following real security game: adversary A gets, say, n commitments, and then may ask for openings of some of them. The security notion of Dwork et al. [22] requires that for any such A, there exists a simulator S that can approximate A's output. More concretely, for any relation R, we require that R(M, out A ) holds about as often as R(M, out S ), where M = (M i ) i∈ [n] are the messages in the commitments, out A is A's output, and out S is S's output. Formally, we get the following definition (where henceforth, I will denote the set of "allowed" opening sets): Definition 8 (Simulatable under selective openings). Assume that n = n(k) > 0 is polynomially bounded, and let I = (I n ) n be a family of sets such that each I n is a set of subsets of [n] . A commitment scheme Com = (S, R) is simulatable under selective openings (short SIM-SO-COM secure) iff for every PPT n-message distribution M, every PPT relation R, and every PPT machine A (the adversary), there is a PPT machine S (the simulator) such that Adv sim-so Com,M,A,S,R is negligible. Here are defined as follows:
In this, we require from A that I ∈ I k , 3 Such an auxiliary input is common in cryptographic definitions to ensure some form of composability. -We do not explicitly hand the chosen set I to the relation R. Handing I to R potentially makes the definition more useful in larger contexts in which I is public. -One could think of letting R determine the message vector M. 4 (Equivalently, we can view M as part of R and let M forward its random coins-or a short seed-to R in a message part M i which is guaranteed not to be opened, e.g., when i ∈ I for all I ∈ I n .) -The order of quantifiers (∀M, R, A∃S) is the weakest one possible. In particular, we do not mandate that S is constructed from A in a black-box way.
In all of the cases, we chose the weaker definitional variant for simplicity, which makes our negative results only stronger. We stress, however, that our positive results (Theorems 2 and 4) hold also for all the stronger definitional variants.
Impossibility from Black-Box Reductions
Formalization of Computational Assumptions Our first result states that SIM-SO-COM security cannot be achieved via black-box reductions from standard assumptions. We want to consider such standard assumptions in a general way that allows one to make statements even in the presence of "relativizing" oracles. Thus we make the following definition, which is a special case of the definition of a primitive from Reingold et al. [41] (cf. also Sect. 2). 3 That is, we actually only quantify over those A for which I ∈ I k . 4 This definition is closer to a universally composable definition (cf. Canetti [9] ) in the sense that R (almost) takes the role of a UC-environment: R selects all inputs and reads the outputs (in particular, the output of A). However, we stress that R may not actively interfere in the commitment protocol. Note that we cannot hope for fully UC-secure commitments for reasons not connected to the selective decommitment problem, cf. Canetti and Fischlin [10] .
Definition 9 ((Security) property of an oracle). Let X be an oracle. Then a security property (or simply property) P of X is a (not necessarily PPT) machine that, after interacting with X and another machine A, finally outputs a bit b. For an adversary A (that may interact with X and P), we define A's advantage against P as Now X is said to satisfy security property P iff for all PPT adversaries A, we have that
In terms of Reingold et al. [41] , the corresponding primitive is P = (F P , R P ), where F P = {X }, and R P (X , A) iff Adv prop P,X ,A is nonnegligible. Our definition is also similar in spirit to "hard games" as used by Dodis et al. [20] but more general.
We emphasize that P can only interact with X and A, but not with possible additional oracles. (See Appendix A for further discussion of properties of oracles, in particular their role in our proofs.) Intuitively, P acts as a challenger in the sense of a cryptographic security experiment. That is, P tests whether adversary A can "break" X in the intended way. We give an example where "breaking" means "breaking X 's one-way property."
Finally, note that a security property as above does not allow one to capture statistical properties such as the bijection property of a function or the (perfect/statistical) correctness property of an encryption scheme. In what follows, we will always consider a fixed oracle X . Its statistical properties will be clear by definition, and in particular they will not change depending on the setting we consider X in. However, the security properties (such as one-wayness) may change, depending on auxiliary oracles that may help to "break" X .
Example If X is a random permutation of {0, 1} k , then the following P models X 's one-way property: P acts as a challenger that challenges A to invert a randomly chosen X -image. Concretely, P initially chooses a random Y ∈ {0, 1} k and sends Y to A. Upon receiving a guess X ∈ {0, 1} k from A, P checks if X (X) = Y . If yes, then P terminates with output b = 1. If X (X) = Y , then P tosses an unbiased coin b ∈ {0, 1} and terminates with output b = b .
We stress that we only gain generality by demanding that Pr[P outputs 1] is close to 1/2 (and not, say, negligible). In fact, this way indistinguishability-based games (such as, e.g., the indistinguishability of ciphertexts of an ideal encryption scheme X ) can be formalized very conveniently. On the other hand, cryptographic games like the oneway game above can be formulated in this framework as well, by letting the challenger output b = 1 with probability 1/2 when A fails.
On the Role of Property P Our upcoming results state the impossibility of (blackbox) security reductions, from essentially any computational assumption (i.e., security property) P. The obvious question is: what if the assumption already is an idealized commitment scheme secure under selective openings? The short answer is: "then the security proof will not be black-box." We give a detailed explanation of what is going on in Appendix A.
Stateless Breaking Oracles
In our impossibility results, we will describe a computational world with a number of oracles. For instance, there will be a "breaking oracle" B such that B aids in breaking the SIM-SO-COM security of any given commitment scheme, and in nothing more. To this end, B takes the role of the adversary in the SIM-SO-COM experiment. Namely, B expects to receive a number of commitments, then chooses a subset of these commitments, and then expects openings of the commitments in this subset. This is an interactive process which would usually require B to hold a state across invocations. However, stateful oracles are not very useful for establishing black-box separations, so we will have to give a stateless formulation of B. Concretely, suppose that the investigated commitment scheme is noninteractive. Then B answers deterministically upon queries and expects each query to be prefixed with the history of that query. For instance, B finally expects to receive openings dec = (dec i ) i∈I along with the corresponding previous commitments com = (com i ) i∈ [n] and previously selected set I . If I is not the set that B would have selected when receiving com alone, then B ignores the query. This way, B is stateless (but randomized, similarly to a random oracle). Furthermore, for noninteractive commitment schemes, this makes sure that any machine interacting with B can open commitments to B only in one way. Hence this formalization preserves the binding property of a commitment scheme, something we will need in our proofs.
We stress, however, that this method does not necessarily work for interactive commitment schemes. Namely, any machine interacting with such a stateless B can essentially "rewind" B during an interactive commitment phase, since B formalizes a nextmessage function. Now if the commitment scheme is still binding if the receiver of the commitment can be rewound (e.g., this holds trivially for noninteractive commitment schemes and also for perfectly binding commitment schemes), then our formalization of B preserves binding, and our upcoming proof works. If, however, the commitment scheme loses its binding property if the receiver can be rewound, then the following theorem cannot be applied.
We are now ready to state our result.
Theorem 1 (Black-box impossibility of noninteractive or perf. binding SIM-SO-COM, most general formulation). Let n = n(k) = 2k, and let I = (I n ) n with However, we will prove that B is useless to any simulator S that gets only a message subset M I : if S uses B before requesting its own message subset M I , then B's answer will not be correlated with the SIM-SO-COM challenge message vector M. (This also holds if S first sends commitments to B and immediately afterwards requests M I from the SIM-SO-COM experiment; in that case, S has to break the binding property of Com * to get an answer from B which is correlated with M.) But if S uses B after obtaining M I , then with very high probability, S will have to open at least one commitment to B whose message is not contained in M I . By definition of M * , this opening of S will not be consistent with the other values of M I (except with small probability), and B's answer will again not be correlated with M.
Since S cannot efficiently extract the seed X * from its message subset M I alone (that would require a brute-force search over exponentially many values), this shows that Com * is not SIM-SO-COM secure. Consequently, because Com * was arbitrary (only the message distribution M * is specific to Com * ), there exist no SIM-SO-COM secure commitment schemes relative to RO and B. Finally, it is easy to see that relative to RO and B, primitive X still satisfies property P. Concretely, observe that B does not break any commitment (note that B's answer depends only on the opened commitments) but only inverts a message distribution (or, rather, RO). Hence, any adversary attacking property P of X can use efficient internal simulations of RO and B instead of the original oracles. Since X satisfies property P with respect to adversaries without (additional) oracle access, the claim follows.
We commence with the full proof.
Proof of Theorem 1. First, let RO be a random oracle (i.e., a random function {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k ). When writing RO(x 1 , . . . , x ), we assume that RO's input x 1 , . . . , x is encoded in a prefix-free way such that all individual x i can be efficiently reconstructed from RO's input. Furthermore, to derive our second oracle B, first consider the following machine B:
1. On input Com, interpret Com as the description of two machines (S, R) as in Definition 1. Then, concurrently receive n Com-commitments, indexed by i ∈ [n]. 2. When all commitments are received, output a uniformly chosen I ∈ I. 3. Engage in |I | concurrent opening phases for the Com-instances with i ∈ I . If all openings are valid (i.e., every receiver instance with i ∈ I outputs some
Unfortunately, we cannot use B directly in our proof, since B is stateful, and black-box separations require stateless oracles. So let B be the oracle that evaluates B's nextmessage function. Formally, B expects queries of the form h = (h i ) i∈[ ] . Upon each such query, B invokes a fresh copy of B and feeds it input messages h 1 up to h successively, ignoring the respective answers of B. Finally, B outputs B's answer to the last input h . The random coins used for B in a given activation are supplied by B as a random (but deterministic) function of the previous message history of B. This way, B itself is randomized but stateless and can be used to emulate interactions with B. (In fact, B models a B which can be rewound.) We now comment on the description of Com that B receives. Com describes two machines S and R, which may make arbitrary oracle calls (even recursive B-queries 6 ). We make no requirement that Com describes a hiding, binding, or correct commitment scheme. However, we do require that S and R are PPT whenever the description Com is generated by a PPT algorithm. We achieve this with a suitable padding: We require that all B-queries h are prefixed with 1 , where bounds B's running time on input h. Here, we count any oracle query with input x as |x| computational steps, and the final computation of all X as one step. This way, not even recursive B-queries consume more than overall steps (not measuring the time needed to parse ), while any PPT commitment scheme Com can still be encoded efficiently.
For 
In other words, this holds if A manages to produce interactions with B in which the same commitment is opened in different ways. From here on, fix a (hiding and binding) commitment scheme Com * = (S * , R * ) such that Com * is noninteractive or perfectly binding (or both). We first show that our modeling of B preserves the binding property of Com * .
Lemma 1.
No PPT adversary A breaks Com * in B with nonnegligible probability.
Proof. If Com * is perfectly binding, there never exists a commitment for which two different openings are possible (as long as the receiver acts honestly). Hence there simply are no h and h as required to break the binding property of Com * in B. On the other hand, if Com * is noninteractive, then A must find a noninteractive commitment com along with two noninteractive openings dec 1 and dec 2 in order to break Com * in B. The (ordinary) binding property of Com * implies that this is not efficiently possible.
of message vectors (i.e., M * chooses X * ∈ {0, 1} k/3 uniformly and then sets M * i = RO(Com * , i, X * ) for all i). 6 Recursive B-queries can be circumvented using the "two-oracle"-technique of Hsiao and Reyzin [34] .
Adapted to our setting, we would only have to consider commitment schemes Com which are formulated independently of the breaking oracle B, so we can assume that Com itself does not query B. This would directly prove fully-black-box reductions impossible. However, at the cost of a little additional care in the mere encoding of our queries (so as to avoid unbounded recursions), we can even show impossibility of relativizing and hence of ∀∃semi-black-box reductions. Proof. Let A be the SIM-SO-COM adversary on Com * that relays between its interface to the SIM-SO-COM experiment and B as follows. We silently assume that A prefixes queries to B with the respective message history and applies a padding as described above.
Lemma 2. There is an adversary A that outputs out
1. Initially, send Com * to B. 2. Relay the n commitments from the SIM-SO-COM experiment to B. 3. Upon receiving I * ∈ I from B, send I * to the SIM-SO-COM experiment. 4. Upon receiving |I * | openings from the experiment, relay these openings to B. 5. Upon receiving a set {X * } from B, return out A = (RO(Com * , i, X * )) i∈ [n] . If B returns a set of larger size, return out A = ⊥.
By construction of M * and B, it is clear that out A = M * unless B returns multiple X (which happens only with negligible probability by a counting argument).
Lemma 3. Any given PPT simulator S will output out
only with negligible probability.
Proof. Fix a PPT S.
We claim that in the ideal SIM-SO-COM experiment, S has a view that is almost statistically independent of X * , and hence will output out S = M * only with negligible probability. To show the claim, denote by I * the subset that S submits to the SIM-SO-COM experiment and by M * I * the messages that S receives back. Denote by Com j , I j , M j I j the corresponding values used in S's j th query
Here and in the following, we consider recursive B-queries made by B during the verification of openings as made by S. We first define and bound a number of "bad" events:
-bad coll occurs iff S reveals a message M j i to B for which there are two distinct
These events occur only with negligible probability: informally, bad coll implies a collision among 2 k/3 uniformly distributed k-bit values, which is ruled out by a birthday bound. bad img means that S guessed an element of a very sparse set. Finally, bad bind means that S broke Com * 's binding property (or, rather, S broke Com * in B). A detailed proof can be found in Lemma 4 below. Now consider the following machine B which is almost identical to B (the difference to B is emphasized): 
. In other words, assuming ¬bad, in order to detect a difference between B and B , S must already have guessed the hidden X * used in the SIM-SO-COM experiment. In particular, since up to that point, oracles B and B behave identically, and S can simulate B internally, S can either extract the hidden X * from the SIM-SO-COM experiment with oracles RO and X alone, or not at all. However, since we defined RO independently and after X , these oracles are independent. Hence, using RO and X alone, the view of S is independent of X * unless S explicitly makes a RO-query involving X * . Since X * ∈ {0, 1} k/3 is uniformly chosen from a suitably large domain, and bad occurs with negligible probability, we get that S's view is almost statistically independent of X * . Consequently, S's view is almost statistically independent of all M * i with i ∈ I * . Hence, S can produce out S = M * only with negligible probability.
It remains to prove that bad occurs only negligibly often.
Lemma 4. Event bad occurs only with negligible probability.
Proof. We show that any of the events bad coll , bad img , bad bind occurs only with negligible probability for any fixed i, j . The full claim then can be derived by a union bound over i, j , and the individual events. So first fix i, j and note that the functions RO(Com j , i, ·) and RO(Com, i , ·) are independent as soon as Com j = Com or i = i . Hence, for all of the events, we can ignore RO-and B-queries with a different Com or i and assume that RO (·) := RO(Com j , i, ·) is a fresh random oracle.
bad coll : Using a birthday bound, we get
which implies that there simply exists no M j i which could raise bad coll , except with probability at most 2 −k/3 . bad img : We show that S's chance to output M i with M i = RO (s) for some s ∈ {0, 1} k/3 and such that X has not been queried to RO -query is negligible. Now S's access to the B-oracle can be emulated using an oracle B that, upon input Y , outputs the set of all X ∈ {0, 1} k/3 with RO (X) = Y . Without loss of generality, we may further assume that S never queries B with a Y which has been obtained through an explicit RO (X)-query. (Namely, unless bad coll occurs, which happens only with negligible probability, B 's answer will then be {X}.) Hence, whenever S receives an answer = ∅ from B , it has already succeeded in producing an M i with RO (X) = M i for some X, and without querying RO (X). So without loss of generality, we can assume that S never queries B and hence only produces such an M i using access to RO and X alone. Clearly, X does not help S, since X and RO are independent. But since the set of all Y for which RO (X) = Y for some X ∈ {0, 1} k/3 is sparse in the set of all Y ∈ {0, 1} k , and S can only make a polynomial number of RO-queries, S's success in producing such an M i is negligible. (Otherwise, I j = I * occurs only with probability 1/|I|, since I j is chosen uniformly and then independent of I * .) We can also assume that Com j = Com * , since otherwise bad bind cannot happen by definition. Hence, S first generates a commit transcript (h j i ) i∈[i I ] , then receives I j and sends I * = I j to the SIM-SO-COM experiment, and only then receives messages M * I * . To achieve bad bind in this situation, S must find a full transcript h j such that M j I j = M * I * . In particular, there is an i ∈ I j such that S opens the ith commitment in h j to a value M * i which S only sees after the transcript of the commit phase is fixed. Hence, if S achieves bad bind with nonnegligible probability, we can construct the following PPT machine A. A first simulates S to extract h = h j and then rewinds S back to the point before it received M * I * . Restarting S with different messages M * I * then yields a transcript h that opens the same commitments as in h to different messages. This contradicts Lemma 1.
Taking things together, this shows that Adv sim-so Com * ,M * ,A,S,R is overwhelming for the relation R(x, y) :⇔ x = y, the described A, and any PPT S. Hence Com * is not SIM-SO-COM secure. It remains to argue that in the described computational world, X still satisfies property P.
Lemma 5. X satisfies P.
Proof. Assume a PPT adversary A on X 's property P. The corollary is a special case of Theorem 1. For instance, to show Corollary1 for one-way permutations, one can use the example X and P from above: X is a random permutation of {0, 1} k , and P models the one-way experiment with X . Clearly, X satisfies P, and so we can apply Corollary 1. This yields impossibility of relativizing proofs for SIM-SO-COM security from one-way permutations. We get impossibility for ∀∃semi-black-box reductions since one-way permutations allow embedding, cf. Simon [44] , Reingold et al. [41] . The other cases are similar. Note that while it is generally not easy to even give a candidate for a cryptographic primitive in the standard model, it is easy to construct an idealized, say, encryption scheme in oracle form.
Of course, it will not be possible to find a real implementation with all the properties of, say, an ideal one-way permutation. For instance, loosely speaking, an ideal oneway permutation contains an exponential amount of entropy. Conversely, the entropy contained in any real one-way permutation is upper bounded by the size of its key. For any efficient implementation of a one-way permutation in the usual sense, this key will be of polynomial size. (A similar argument holds for one-way functions.) Intuitively, this shows the limitations of black-box impossibility results in the style of Corollary 1. In particular, we do not exclude commitment schemes whose security is built on the fact that the used one-way permutation contains only a polynomial amount of entropy. The essence of Corollary 1 hence is: we exclude only constructions that solely build on the, say, one-way property of the employed permutation, but not in any way on how this one-wayness is achieved. We only show that no security proofs exist which work for any, possibly not efficiently realizable, black box that has the assumed one-way property.
We stress that Corollary 1 makes no assumptions about the nature of the simulation (in the sense of Definition 8). In particular, the simulator may freely use, e.g., the code of the adversary; the only restriction is black-box access to the underlying primitive. As discussed in the introduction, this is quite different from the result one gets upon combining Goldreich and Krawczyk [27] and Dwork et al. [22] : essentially, combining [22, 27] shows impossibility of constructing S in a black-box way from A (i.e., such that S only gets black-box access to A's next-message function).
Finally, we emphasize that our results do not necessarily hold when assuming a model with trusted set-up information. In fact, it is possible to construct noninteractive SIM-SO-COM secure commitment schemes relative to a common reference string. See Sect. 5 for a detailed explanation.
Generalizations First, Corollary 1 constitutes merely an example instantiation of the much more general Theorem 1. Second, the proof also holds for a relaxation of SIM-SO-COM security considered by Dwork et al. [22] , Definition 7.3, where adversary and simulator approximate a function of the message vector.
Possibility Using Non-Black-Box Techniques
Non-Black-Box Techniques vs. Interaction Theorem 1 essentially shows that SIM-SO-COM security cannot be achieved unless one uses non-black-box techniques or interaction. In this section, we will investigate the power of non-black-box techniques to achieve SIM-SO-COM security. As it turns out, for our purposes, a concurrently composable zero-knowledge argument system is a suitable non-black-box tool. 7 We stress that the use of this zero-knowledge argument makes our scheme necessarily interactive and so actually circumvents Theorem 1 in two ways: by non-black-box techniques and by interaction. However, from a conceptual point of view, our scheme is "noninteractive up to the zero-knowledge argument." In particular, our proof does not use the fact that the zero-knowledge argument is interactive. (That is, if we used a concurrently composable noninteractive zero-knowledge argument in, say, the common reference string model, our proof would still work. See also the discussion in Sect. 5 on how this relates to our impossibility results.)
The Scheme For our non-black-box scheme, we need an interactive argument system IP with perfect completeness and negligible soundness error and such that IP is zeroknowledge under concurrent composition. We also need a perfectly binding noninteractive commitment scheme Com b . Both these ingredients can be constructed from oneway permutations. To ease presentation, we only describe a bit commitment scheme, which is easily extended (along with the proof) to the multibit case. In a nutshell, the sender S ZK commits twice (using Com b ) to the same bit and proves in zero-knowledge (using IP) that the committed bits are the same. 8 In the opening phase, the sender opens one (randomly selected) commitment. Note that this overall commitment scheme is 7 We require concurrent composability since the SIM-SO-COM definition considers multiple, concurrent sessions of the commitment scheme. 8 We note that a FOCS referee, reviewing an earlier version of this paper without ZKCom, also suggested to employ zero-knowledge to prove consistency of a given commitment. This suggestion was independent of the eprint version of this paper which at that time already contained our scheme ZKCom. Furthermore, a Eurocrypt referee, reviewing a version of the paper with ZKCom, remarked that alternative constructions of a SIM-SO-COM secure commitment scheme are possible. A more generic construction could be along the lines of "commit using a perfectly binding commitment, then prove consistency of commitment or opening using concurrent zero-knowledge."
binding, since IP ensures that both commitments contain the same bits and that the underlying commitment Com b is binding. For a SIM-SO-COM simulation, we generate inconsistent overall commitments which can later be opened arbitrarily by choosing which individual Com b -commitment is opened. We can use the simulator of IP to generate fake consistency proofs for these inconsistent commitments. (Since we consider many concurrent commitment instances in our SIM-SO-COM experiment, we require concurrent composability from IP for that.)
be a perfectly binding noninteractive commitment scheme. Let IP = (P, V) be an interactive argument system for NP which enjoys perfect completeness, has negligible soundness error, and which is zero-knowledge under concurrent composition. Define ZKCom = (S ZK , R ZK ) for the following machines S ZK and R ZK :
-Commitment to bit b: Proof Outline We start with the real SIM-SO-COM experiment with an arbitrary adversary A. As a first step, we substitute the proofs generated during the commitments by simulated proofs. Concretely, we hand to A proofs for the consistency of the commitments that are generated by a suitable simulator S * . By the concurrent zero-knowledge property of IP, such an S * exists and yields indistinguishable experiment outputs. Note that S * does not need witnesses to generate valid-looking proofs but instead uses (possibly rewinding or even non-black-box) access to A. Hence, we can substitute all ZKComcommitments with inconsistent commitments of the form (com 0 , com 1 ), where com 0 and com 1 are Com b -commitments to different bits. Such a ZKCom-commitment can later be opened arbitrarily. By the computational hiding property of Com b (and since we do not need witnesses to generate consistency proofs anymore), this step does not change the output distribution of the experiment significantly. But note that now, the 9 Formally, the corresponding language L for IP consists of statements x = (com 0 , com 1 ) and witnesses
initial generation of the commitments does not need knowledge of the actual messages. In fact, only the messages M I of the actually opened commitments need to be known at opening time. Hence, at this point, the modified experiment is a valid simulator in the sense of the ideal SIM-SO-COM experiment. Since the experiment output has only been changed negligibly by our modifications, we have thus constructed a successful simulator in the sense of Definition 8.
A full proof is given now. In Game 1, we interpret the first stage of the experiment as a verifier V * in the sense of Definition 5. To this end, we constructively define random variables
Proof of
2. uniformly and independently choose n bits j 1 , . . . , j n , 3. for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ {0, 1}, compute (com j i , dec
Using this notation, the commitment stage of Exp sim-so-real ZKCom,M,A,R can be expressed as an interaction of n concurrent instances of prover P with a suitable verifier V * as in Definition 5. 10 Concretely, we define a verifier V * that, on input (
, internally simulates Exp sim-so-real ZKCom,M,A,R up to the point where A outputs I . The interactive arguments which show that com 0 i and com 1 i commit to the same bit are performed concurrently with (n instances of) a prover P that gets
Finally, V * outputs out V * = I , so that I will be part of the transcript
This setting is merely a reformulation of Exp sim-so-real ZKCom,M,A,R as a concurrent zeroknowledge argument, so we have that
10 Note that Definition 5 trivially implies security for all distributions on (x, w), z V * and z D . Also recall that Definition 5 models two different auxiliary inputs z V * (for V * and S * ) and z D (for D). We emphasize again that this is without loss of generality, cf. the discussion after Definition 4.
In 
The crucial conceptual difference to Game 3 is that now the execution of D requires only knowledge about the message parts (M i ) i∈I selected by S * and not the full message vector M.
We can now reformulate Game 4 as an ideal SIM-SO-COM experiment. First, we define a simulator S as follows: first, S prepares bits b i and commitments (com 0 i , com 1 i ) as in Game 4 and then runs an internal simulation of S * on these commitments. Upon obtaining I from S * , S outputs I . Then, upon input (M i ) i∈I , S runs an internal simulation of A on input (j i , dec Putting things together, we get that Where Is the Non-Black-Box Component? Interestingly, the used argument system IP itself can well be black-box zero-knowledge (where black-box zero-knowledge means that the simulator S * from Definition 5 has only black-box access to the next-message function of V * ). The essential fact that allows us to circumvent our negative result, Theorem 1, is the way we employ IP. Namely, ZKCom uses IP to prove a statement about two given commitments (com 0 , com 1 ). This proof (or, rather, argument) uses an explicit and non-black-box description of the employed commitment scheme Com b . It is this argument that cannot even be expressed when Com b makes use of, say, a one-way function given in oracle form.
The Role of the Commitment Randomness
Observe that the opening of a ZKComcommitment does not release all randomness used for constructing the commitment. In fact, it is easy to see that our proof would not hold if S ZK opened both commitments com 0 and com 1 in the opening phase. Hence, ZKCom is not suitable for settings in which an opening corresponds to a corruption of a party (e.g., in a multi-party computation setting), and when one cannot assume no trusted erasures.
Generalizations First, ZKCom can be straightforwardly extended to a multibit commitment scheme, e.g., by running several sessions of ZKCom in parallel. Second, ZKCom is SIM-SO-COM secure also against adversaries with auxiliary input z: our proof holds literally, where of course we also require security of Com b against nonuniform adversaries.
An Inndistinguishability-Based Definition
Motivated by the impossibility result from the previous section, we now relax Definition 8 as follows:
Definition 10 (Indistinguishable under selective openings). Let n = n(k) > 0 be polynomially bounded, and let I = (I n ) n be a family of sets such that each I n is a set of subsets of 
Again, we require from A that I ∈ I k , and we denote by A, (S i ) i the output of A after interacting concurrently with instances S i of S. Furthermore, M | M I denotes the message distribution M conditioned on the values of M I .
On the Conditioned Distribution M | M I
We stress that, depending on M, it may be computationally hard to sample M ← M | M I , even if (the unconditioned) M is PPT. This might seem strange at first and inconvenient when applying the definition in some larger reduction proof. However, there simply seems to be no other way to capture indistinguishability, since the set of opened commitments depends on the commitments themselves. In particular, in general we cannot predict which commitments the adversary wants opened and then, say, substitute the not-to-be-opened commitments with random commitments. What we chose to do instead is to give the adversary either the full message vector or an independent message vector which "could be" the full message vector, given the opened commitments. We believe that this is the canonical way to capture secrecy of the unopened commitments under selective openings. We should also stress that it is this definition that turns out to be useful in the context of interactive argument systems, see Sect. 6.
The Relation Between SIM-SO-COM Security and IND-SO-COM Security
Unfortunately, we (currently) cannot prove that SIM-SO-COM security implies IND-SO-COM security (although this seems plausible, since usually simulation-based definitions imply their indistinguishability-based counterparts). Technically, the reason why we are unable to prove an implication is the conditioned distribution M | M I in the ideal IND-SO-COM experiment, which cannot be sampled from during an (efficient) reduction.
A Relaxation Alternatively, we could let the adversary predict a predicate π of the whole message vector and consider him successful if
for the alternative message vector M ← M | M I differ non-negligibly. We stress that our upcoming negative result (as well as the application in Sect. 6) also applies to this relaxed notion.
Impossibility from Black-Box Reductions
Theorem 3 (Black-box impossibility of perf. binding IND-SO-COM, most general formulation). Let n = n(k) = 2k, and let I = (I n ) n with I n = {I ⊆ [n] | |I | = n/2} denote the set of all n/2-sized subsets of [n] . Let X be an oracle that satisfies a property P even in presence of an EXPSPACE-oracle. We also assume that X is computable in EXPSPACE. 11 Then, there exists a set of oracles relative to which X still satisfies P, but no perfectly binding commitment scheme is indistinguishable under selective openings.
Proof Outline Similarly to Theorem 1, we specify an oracle RO which induces a message distribution M * . This time, however, RO maps E n/2+1 -elements to message vectors in E n , where E = {0, 1} k is the domain of each individual message. Hence, n/2 messages usually do not fix the whole message vector, but more messages do. Now fix any perfectly binding commitment scheme Com * . We define a breaking oracle B that, like the B from Theorem 1, asks for n Com * -commitments and subsequent openings of a random subset I ∈ I n of these commitments. If all openings are valid, B extracts the whole message vector in the commitments (note that this is possible since Com * is perfectly binding) and returns a "close" (with respect to Hamming distance) element in the message distribution M * if there is a sufficiently close one. It is easy to see that an adversary can use B to obtain the whole message vector M in the real IND-SO-COM experiment. But a message vector freshly sampled from M * , conditioned on the opened messages M I , will most likely be different from M. Hence, our adversary easily distinguishes the real from the ideal IND-SO-COM experiment.
The main part of the proof shows that oracle B is useless to an adversary attacking X 's property P. Assume first that the commitment scheme Com with respect to which an adversary A on X queries B is perfectly binding. In that case, a somewhat technical but straightforward combinatorial argument shows that A's successfully opened messages M I , together with A's queries to RO, determine B's answer (except with small probability). Hence A can use internal simulations of B and RO instead of the original oracles, and hence property P of X is not damaged by the presence of B. To ensure that B is only useful for perfectly binding commitment schemes Com, we let B test whether Com is perfectly binding. Since we demand that Com is perfectly binding, this test is independent of the random coins used by X . Indeed, B needs to check that for all syntactically possible commitments and decommitments and all possible random coins used by X , the opened message is unique. Hence, by assumption about X , this test can also be performed by A using an EXPSPACE-oracle, and the above proof idea applies.
A full proof follows.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let E = {0, 1} k and ε := .01. Let EX PSPACE be an EXPSPACE-oracle. We stress that EX PSPACE can be used to perform inefficient computations, but EX PSPACE itself never makes oracle queries (e.g., to X or the oracles RO and B presented below). Let RO be a random function from E n/2+1 to E n . We write M ∈ RO when M ∈ E n lies in the range of RO. For M, M ∈ E n and > 0, we write M ≡ ε M iff Mand M coincide in at least (1 − ε)n components (i.e., iff there exists R ⊆ [n], |R| ≥ (1 − ε)n , with M R = M R ). To construct our last oracle B, let B be the machine that proceeds as follows. First, we claim that the probability for S = {M * } is overwhelming, where M * denotes the message vector sampled by the IND-SO-COM experiment. By construction of B, we have M * ∈ S. Furthermore, for any M ∈ S, it must hold that M ≡ ε M * . But for any distinct X 1 , X 2 ∈ E n/2+1 , we have that RO(X 1 ) ≡ ε RO(X 2 ) with probability
A union bound over all M ∈ RO shows that the probability that there exists an M ∈ S, M = M * , is negligible. Hence S = {M * } with overwhelming probability. Thus, A outputs 1 in the real IND-SO-COM experiment with overwhelming probability, since then M = M * . However, in the ideal IND-SO-COM experiment, M = M * with overwhelming probability (since for uniformly chosen M * ∈ RO, the expected number of M ∈ RO with M I = M * I is about |E| = 2 k ). Consequently, A outputs 1 in the ideal IND-SO-COM experiment only with negligible probability. We get that Adv ind-so Com * ,M * ,A is overwhelming, which proves the lemma.
Lemma 7. X satisfies P.
Proof. Consider a PPT adversary A on X 's property P. Note that A may use RO, B, and EX PSPACE freely. We proceed in games to show that Adv prop P,X ,A is negligible. Let Game 0 be the original security experiment in which A attacks X 's property P. We say that a B-query is a commit query (resp. open query) if it finishes the commitment (resp. opening) phase in the corresponding interaction with B, such that B responds with an I ∈ I (resp. a set of M ∈ RO). In the following, we count a recursive B-query made by B in the role of R as made by A. Without loss of generality, we may assume that A always makes precisely p(k) open queries for a fixed polynomial p and never makes a query twice. We also assume that for any of A's open queries, A made a corresponding commit query first. 12 Let out 0 denote P's output in Game 0. By definition, we have We show in Lemma 8 below that S = S except with probability asymptotically smaller than 2 −3εk , so that
for sufficiently large k and all i ∈ [p(k)].
Observe that in Game p(k), B p(k) and RO can both be simulated efficiently inside A. Indeed, B p(k) only needs knowledge about A's RO-queries and access to EX PSPACE to check whether a given commitment scheme is perfectly binding. Hence, Combining Lemmas 9, 10, 11, and 12 below shows Lemma 8.
Lemma 9.
In the situation of Lemma 7, |S| ≤ 1 except with probability at most q(k)2 −k for some polynomial q.
Proof. We interpret the whole Game i (including A, P, X , B i , and EX PSPACE) as a machine A interacting with RO. Note that A may be computationally unbounded but only makes a polynomial number of RO-queries, at least until A's ith open query. Let Q RO denote the set of RO-queries of A . Now |S| > 1 implies that there are X 1 , X 2 ∈ Q RO with X 1 = X 2 such that RO(X 1 ), RO(X 2 ) ∈ S, and so RO(X 1 ) I = RO(X 2 ) I . However, the statistical properties of RO imply that for any X 1 , X 2 ∈ Q RO , RO(X 1 ) and RO(X 2 ) match in at least one component with probability at most n2 −k . A union bound over all such pairs shows the claim.
Lemma 10.
In the situation of Lemma 7, |S | ≤ 1 except with probability at most q(k)2 −k for some polynomial q.
Proof.
As in Lemma 9, we interpret Game i as a machine A interacting with RO. Again, let Q RO denote the set of RO-queries of A . Now let X be the set of all X ∈ E n/2+1 \ Q RO with RO(X) I = M I . Using, e.g., Chebyshev's inequality, we get |X| < 2|E|, except with probability at most 2 −k . Furthermore, Q RO contains at most one query X with RO(X) I = M I except with probability at most q 1 (k)2 −k for some polynomial q 1 (with similar reasoning as in Lemma 9) . Let X := X ∪ {X} for that X ∈ Q RO , or X := X if no such X exists. By the preceding discussion, |X | ≤ 2E except with probability (q 1 
Observe that the values RO(X) for X ∈ X are independent, conditioned only on RO(X) I = M I . For any fixed X 1 , X 2 ∈ X with X 1 = X 2 , the probability that RO(
(1/2−2ε)n /|E| (1/2−2ε)n , which is less than 2 −3k−2 for sufficiently large k. Assuming that |X | ≤ 2|E| = 2 k+1 , a union bound yields that no such X 1 , X 2 exist, and hence |S | ≤ 1, except with probability 2 −k . Summing up shows the claim.
Lemma 11.
In the situation of Lemma 7, we have S = ∅ and |S | = 1 simultaneously with probability at most q(k)2 −k/2 for some polynomial q.
Proof. Let bad denote the event that S = ∅ but S = {M } for some M , and let bad j denote the event that bad occurs and A's ith open query refers to A's j th commit query.
Since A makes only polynomially many B i -queries, there is a polynomial
Consider the machine A that simulates Game i and interacts externally only with oracle RO. Call I 1 ∈ I the answer of B i to A's j th commit query. After A submits its ith open query, A rewinds the simulation back to A's j th commit query, and then restarts with a freshly sampled I 2 ∈ I as B i 's answer to A's j th commit query. By bad j ,1 , resp. bad j ,2 , we denote the events that bad j occurs before, resp. after the rewinding. It is clear that Pr[bad j ,1 ] = Pr[bad j ,2 ] = Pr[bad j ], but unfortunately, the events bad j ,1 and bad j ,2 may be dependent. We have to work to establish that bad j ,1 and bad j ,2 occur simultaneously with sufficiently large probability. Consider a prefix E j of A 's execution until A's j th commit query. Given any such E j and a fixed oracle RO, the events bad j ,1 and bad j ,2 are independent and occur with the same probability, so that
where ( Let Q RO,1 denote the set of A 's RO-queries before the rewinding, and let Q RO,2 denote the set of A 's RO-queries after the rewinding and before A's j th commit query. The rationale here is that Q RO,1 are A's queries in the run related to I 1 , and Q RO,2 are A's queries in the run related to I 2 . Note that Q RO,1 and Q RO,2 share A's queries before the j th commitment. We write RO(Q RO,i ) for the set of all RO(X) for X ∈ Q RO,i . Now bad j ,1 ∧ bad j ,2 implies that A opens two subsets M I 1 and M I 2 message vector Minside the j th commit query, such that there exist M 1 , M 2 ∈ RO with the following properties:
We claim that M 1 = M 2 with high probability. To see this, let M be set of all M ∈ RO \ RO(Q RO,1 ) which satisfy M I 1 ∩I 2 = M I 1 ∩I 2 . A simple calculation shows that m := |I 1 ∩ I 2 | ≥ n/10 except with probability at most 2 −k for sufficiently large k. Now |M|'s expected value is, depending on |Q RO,1 |, at most |E| n/2+1−m . A Chebyshev bound as in Lemma 10 yields that |M| ≤ |E| n/2−m+2 except with probability at most q 2 (k)2 −k for some polynomial q 2 . So assume |I 1 ∩ I 2 | ≥ n/10 and |M| ≤ |E| n/2−m+2 . Then, for any two M 1 , M 2 ∈ M with M 1 = M 2 , we have M 1 ≡ 2ε M 2 with probability at most n−m 2εn /|E| n−m− 2εn . A simple calculation and a union bound over all M 1 , M 2 ∈ M yield that there do not exist M 1 , M 2 ∈ M with M 1 ≡ 2ε M 2 yet M 1 = M 2 , except with probability at most q 3 (k)2 −k for some polynomial q 3 . So for the M 1 , M 2 guaranteed by bad j ,1 ∧ bad j ,2 , either M 1 = M 2 , or M 2 ∈ M with high probability. Now M 2 ∈ M implies that M 2 = RO(X) for some X ∈ Q RO,1 , and bad j ,2 even dictates X ∈ Q RO,1 \ Q RO,2 . Put differently, M 2 ∈ M implies that in the execution after the rewinding, M I 2 = M 2 I 2 contains a component of an RO-image M 2 obtained (independently, since M 2 ∈ Q RO,2 ) before the rewinding. By symmetry, the probability that this happens equals the probability that M I 1 contains a component of an ROimage M 1 queried after the rewinding. However, this essentially means that A has guessed a component of the result of an upcoming RO-query, which can happen with probability at most q 4 (k)2 −k for some polynomial q 4 by the statistical properties of RO. We conclude that hence, M 2 ∈ M and so M 1 = M 2 except with probability at most q 5 (k)2 −k for a polynomial q 5 .
Finally, a counting argument shows that |I 1 ∪ I 2 | < n/2 + 2 happens with probability less than 2 −k for large enough k. Summarizing, bad glue : 
Lemma 12.
In the situation of Lemma 7, we have |S| = 1 and S = ∅ simultaneously with probability at most 2 −(ε/2)k for large enough k.
Proof. Again, we interpret the whole Game i (except for RO) as a machine A interacting with RO. As in Lemma 11, A waits for A's ith open query M I and then rewinds the whole game back to A's j th commit query. Again, A resamples an I ← I as a fresh answer to A's j th commit query, in the hope that A opens M I in the ith open query. However, this time A repeats this process p(k) times for a suitable number p(k) to be determined later. Let S and I denote the values of I and S from the th rewinding. Now fix random tapes for all machines simulated inside A and fix an RO. This means that the only randomness during the execution of A comes from the choice of the I . Let bad denote the event that |S| = 1 but S = ∅, and let bad j denote the event that bad occurs and A's ith open query refers to A's j th commit query. Since A makes only polynomially many B i -queries, there is a polynomial q = q(k) and a function j = j (k) such that Pr[bad j ] ≥ Pr[bad]/q(k), where the probability is only over I ∈ I.
Suppose that Pr[bad] > 2 −(ε/2)k for contradiction, so that Pr[bad j ] > 2 −εk for large enough k. Let I ⊆ I be the set of all I such that bad j occurs when A receives I upon the j th commit query. Note that I is well-defined, since we fixed all randomness except for I . Assume first that there exists a subset B ⊆ [n] of size |B| > εn with Pr[I ∈ I ∧ i ∈ I ] < 2 −2εk for all i ∈ B, where the probability is over I ∈ I. We have
creates a contradiction for sufficiently large k. Hence, no such B exists, so there must be a subset
Our goal is now to use A to extract M R with high probability. To this end, we first finish our description of A . Let L denote the set of all ∈ [p(k)] for which bad j occurs in the th rewinding. After p(k) := 2 8εk rewindings, A outputs M J , where J = ∈L I is the union of all successfully extracted partial message subsets. For ∈ L, we have |S | = 1 by definition of bad j , so say S = {M }. By definition, M has been obtained by A through an explicit RO-query, and we have M I = M I for the message vector M inside A's j th commit query. Similar to Lemma 9, all components of all RO-images obtained by A are pairwise distinct, except with probability at most 2 −k/2 for large enough k. As in Lemma 11, we can show that all the RO-images M are identical, except with probability 2 −k/2 for sufficiently large k. Thus, there exists one single M ∈ RO with M J = M J . Now note that the I are independent. Hence, a Chebyshev bound shows that for each fixed i ∈ R, there is an I ∈ L ⊆ I with i ∈ I , except with probability at most 2 −6εk . A union bound over all i ∈ R yields R ⊆ J except with probability at most 2 −5εk for large enough k. So, except with probability 2 −6εk + 2 k/2 < Pr[bad], A shows the existence of an M ∈ RO with M J = M J for |J | ≥ (1 − ε)n , such that M ≡ ε M. Since M I = M I for any I ∈ L, this contradicts bad j and thus bad. Hence, our assumption on Pr[bad] must have been incorrect, and we have proved the lemma.
Combining Lemmas 6 and 7 shows Theorem 3.
On the Requirement on X We require that X is secure even in the presence of an EXPSPACE-oracle but can be simulated by an EXPSPACE-oracle as well. This means that in any polynomial interaction with black-box access to X , it is computationally infeasible to break X , even with exponential computing powers. At the same time, X itself should be implementable in exponential time. We stress that this requirement on X is a rather mild one. For instance, random oracles are one-way even against computationally unbounded adversaries, as long as the adversary makes only a polynomial number of oracle queries. Hence, an EXPSPACE-oracle (which itself does not perform oracle queries) is not helpful in breaking a random oracle. This even holds when the random oracle uses lazy sampling (and hence is polynomial-time in any polynomial context) or when the random oracle is actually only a t-wise independent hash function for slightly superpolynomial t (say, t (k) = k log k). It is also noteworthy that the choice of EXPSPACE was rather arbitrary; any oracle that is sufficient to simulate X , and at the same time not sufficient to break X will do in place of EX PSPACE.
So similarly to Corollary 1, we get for concrete choices of X and P:
Corollary 2 (Black-box impossibility of perf. binding IND-SO-COM). Generalizations Again, Corollary 2 constitutes merely an example instantiation of the much more general Theorem 3. We stress, however, that the proof for Theorem 3 does not apply to "almost-perfectly binding" commitment schemes such as the one from Naor [37] . (For instance, for such schemes, B's check that the supplied commitment scheme is binding might tell something about X .)
Statistically Hiding Schemes Are Secure
Fortunately, things look different for statistically hiding commitment schemes: Proof Outline Intuitively, the claim holds since an adversary A's views in the real, resp. ideal IND-SO-COM experiment are statistically close (and hence so must be A's outputs). However, the fact that A's views are indeed statistically close is less obvious than it may seem at first glance. Our proof proceeds in games and starts with the real IND-SO-COM experiment with A. As a first modification, we change the opening phase of the experiment, so that the opening of each selected commitment is produced solely from the commitment itself and the "target message" M i to which it should be opened (but not from opening information previously generated alongside the commitment). Note that this change is merely conceptual and does not alter A's view at all. This makes the opening phase inefficient, but since we are dealing with statistically hiding commitment schemes, we need not worry about that. Indeed, by the statistical hiding property, we can now substitute all commitments (in a hybrid argument) with commitments to a fixed value (say, 0 k ) without affecting the experiment output. We can reduce this step to the hiding property of the commitment scheme since the experiment only needs commitments as input and produces all openings on its own. At this point, all commitments that A gets are independent of M, and so the whole view of A is independent of the unopened values M [n]\I . Hence A's output is (almost) independent of M [n]\I in the real IND-SO-COM experiment and, with similar reasoning, also in the ideal IND-SO-COM experiment. This shows the claim.
We proceed to the full proof.
Proof of Theorem 4. Fix an n-message distribution M and a PPT adversary A on the SIM-SO-COM security of Com. We proceed in games. In Game 0, AltDec will never return ⊥ (since AltDec is invoked with a transcript H i that has actually been produced as a commit phase to M i ). Moreover, the view of the adversary is not altered by resampling the internal state of the sender, conditioned on all previous actions, as AltDec does. Hence, we have
Game −1 is the real IND-SO-COM experiment
for the output out 0 of the experiment in Game 0.
We describe Game j (for j ∈ [n]). Game j is identical to Game 0, except for step 2:
Obviously, for j = 0, we would get Game 0. Note that only difference between Game j − 1 and Game j is the commitment to M j . In fact, we can now construct an adversary A on Com's statistical hiding property. A first uniformly chooses j ∈ [n], then simulates Game j − 1, but picks M j and 0 k as challenge messages for its own experiment We stress that the proof of Theorem 4 also holds (literally) in case A and/or M get an additional auxiliary input z.
Application to Adaptively Secure Encryption
Motivation and Setting Taking up the motivation of Damgård [17] , we consider the setting of an adversary A that may corrupt, in an adaptive manner, a subset of a set of parties P 1 , . . . , P n . Assume that for all i, the public encryption key pk i with which party P i encrypts outgoing messages is publicly known. Suppose further that A may corrupt parties based on all public keys and all so far received ciphertexts. When A corrupts P i , A learns P i 's internal state and history, in particular A learns the randomness used for all of that party's encryptions and its secret key sk i . We assume the following:
1. The number of parties is n = 2k for the security parameter k, 2. It is allowed for A to choose at some point a subset I ⊆ [n] of size n/2 and to corrupt all these P i (i ∈ I ). 3. We can interpret the used encryption scheme as a (noninteractive, hiding, and binding) commitment scheme Com = (S, R) in the following sense: S(M) generates a fresh public key pk and outputs a commitment com = (pk, Enc(pk, M; r)) and an opening dec = (M, r). Here Enc denotes the encryption algorithm of the encryption scheme, and r denotes the randomness used while encrypting M. Verification of (com, dec) = (pk, C, M, r) checks that Enc(pk, M; r) = C.
Note that the third assumption does not follow from the scheme's correctness. Indeed, correctness implies only that honestly generated (pk, M) are committing. However, there are schemes for which it is easy to come up with fake public keys and ciphertexts (i.e., fake commitments) which are computationally indistinguishable from honestly generated commitments but can be opened in arbitrary ways. Prominent examples of such schemes are noncommitting encryption schemes [4, 11, 12, 14, 18] , which however generally involve periodical interaction and are comparatively inefficient.
Application of Our Impossibility Results
Attacks in this setting cannot be simulated in a black-box way in the sense of, e.g., Canetti et al. [11] : such a simulator would in particular be able to simulate openings (in the sense of Com, i.e., openings of ciphertexts). Hence, this would imply a simulator for Com in the sense of SIM-SO-COM security Definition 8. Now from Corollary 1 we know that the construction and security analysis of such a simulator requires either a very strong computational assumption or fundamentally non-black-box techniques. Even worse: if Com is perfectly binding, 13 then Corollary 2 shows that even secrecy in the sense of Definition 10 14 cannot be proved in a black-box way. On top of that, we cannot hope to use our (non-blackbox) SIM-SO-COM secure scheme ZKCom to construct an encryption scheme in a non-black-box way, since ZKCom's commitment phase is inherently interactive. We stress that these negative results only apply if encryption really constitutes a (binding) commitment scheme in the above sense. In fact, e.g., [11] construct a sophisticated noncommitting (i.e., nonbinding) encryption scheme and prove simulatability for their scheme. Our results show that such a noncommitting property is to a certain extent necessary. 15 Relation to the Works of Bellare et al. and Hemenway and Ostrovsky Bellare et al. [7] and Hemenway and Ostrovsky [32] construct encryption schemes that are secure under selective openings. Their schemes achieve a security notion that is comparable to our SIM-SO-COM and IND-SO-COM definitions, only for encryption schemes instead of commitments. There is no contradiction to our impossibility results because their encryption schemes do not constitute commitment schemes. In fact, they employ "lossy encryption," which allows for the following idea to prove (encryption) security under selective openings. Start with the real attack game. Then, substitute all public keys with "lossy public keys" (i.e., public keys that yield ciphertexts that contain no information about the message). Openings for the adversary are prepared "on the fly," where we assume that a lossy ciphertext can be efficiently opened to any given message. This modified game essentially is a simulated attack game in which the adversary does not get any (real) encryptions but only lossy encryptions, which can be prepared independently of the true message vector. 13 In the presence of nonuniform adversaries, this is already implied by the fact that the scheme is noninteractive and computationally binding.
14 In the context of encryption, Definition 10 would translate to a variant of indistinguishability of ciphertexts. 15 "To a certain extent necessary" means that our results imply (black-box) impossibility of adaptively secure committing encryption. Of course, there is a gap between "not committing" (in the sense that public keys and encryptions do not commit to plaintexts) and "noncommitting" (as defined in [11] ), and our arguments do not apply to schemes in that gap.
In view of our impossibility results about commitment schemes, it is noteworthy that [7, 32] crucially use that honestly generated tuples (pk, Enc(pk, M; r)) are computationally indistinguishable from tuples (pk , C ) for lossy public keys pk and lossy ciphertexts C . The proof of selective opening security of their encryption schemes shows furthermore that such "lossy tuples" do not at all commit to a particular message. Hence, their schemes do not constitute commitment schemes in the above sense.
Sender Corruptions vs. Receiver Corruptions
Note that the schemes of [7, 32] are built on the fact that only "sender corruptions" are considered. (With "sender corruptions," an opening of a ciphertext does not reveal the secret key but only the encryption randomness.) In case of "receiver corruptions" (in which an opening reveals the secret key), Nielsen [39] argues that every encryption scheme is "eventually committing." Here, "eventually committing" means that, after encrypting suitably many messages, there is only one secret key that decrypts all of these ciphertexts back to their original messages. 16 In that sense, suitably many encryptions of known messages commit to (the functionality of) the secret key. Hence, using our results, no encryption scheme can be proved secure under selective openings against receiver corruptions with a black-box reduction to standard cryptographic assumptions.
Commitment Schemes with Trusted Set-Up
Our impossibility results are formulated in the plain model, i.e., in a model without trusted set-up (such as a common reference string). We remark that a trusted set-up actually does allow to circumvent our impossibility result. For instance, when assuming a trusted set-up of (honestly generated) public keys, any public key encryption scheme constitutes a (noninteractive) commitment scheme in the above sense. Namely, the trusted setup of the encryption public key and correctness of the scheme (for honestly generated public keys) guarantee that an encryption can only be opened one way. Moreover, if an encryption scheme is secure under selective openings, then so it is when viewed as a commitment scheme. In particular, the schemes of [7, 32] constitute noninteractive SIM-SO-COM secure commitment schemes, assuming a trusted setup.
In a similar vein, it should be noted that [32] also build noninteractive IND-SO-COM secure commitment schemes from a special type of randomized one-way functions, tightly related to homomorphic encryption. The security (both secrecy and binding) of this commitment scheme relies on the ideal choice of a set of public parameters. Since our impossibility results do not take into account an ideal parameter setup, there is no contradiction.
As another example, recall our SIM-SO-COM secure commitment scheme ZKCom from Sect. 3.2. This scheme actually becomes noninteractive when using a noninteractive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof system IP (see, e.g., Goldreich [26] , Sect. 4.10). There is no contradiction to our impossibility results because the resulting scheme still uses non-black-box techniques and because NIZK proof systems do not exist in the plain model (i.e., without setup or other additional assumptions). However, when assuming a trusted setup, one can at least implement NIZK proof systems, and thus build noninteractive SIM-SO-COM secure commitment schemes.
(Non)programmable Trusted Set-Up So we can summarize that relative to a trusted setup, our impossibility results do not necessarily hold. Now it may be interesting to see where exactly things go wrong in the proof of, e.g., Theorem 1, with a trusted setup. To this end, we can distinguish two kinds of security proofs in trusted setup settings: (a) proofs during which the trusted setup is "reprogrammed," and (b) proofs that take the trusted setup as a given.
Let us explain: type-(a) proofs actively modify the generation and/or distribution of the trusted setup. For instance, assume an honestly generated public key for the schemes of [7, 32] as a trusted setup. As outlined above, we can then view encryptions as commitments, and the resulting commitment scheme is secure under selective openings. However, the proof of, e.g., SIM-SO-COM security constructs a simulator S that tweaks the distribution of the setup. (Namely, S expects to work with lossy keys instead of honestly generated public keys.) Similarly, during the security proof of NIZK proof systems in the common reference string (CRS) model, the NIZK simulator S * expects to actively choose the CRS, so that it knows a certain CRS trapdoor.
So abstractly, type-(a) proofs "reprogram" the setup information and consider settings in which the setup may lose its guarantees. All discussed proofs for selective opening secure commitment schemes in the trusted setup model are type-(a) proofs. Similarly, proofs in the programmable random oracle model (such as the proof of the noncommitting encryption scheme of Nielsen [39] ) can be seen as type-(a) proofs.
On the other hand, a type-(b) simulator uses an externally given trusted setup. Many protocols that use a public key infrastructure or protocols in the generalized universal composability model have type-(b) proofs (e.g., [15, 33] ). Also, proofs in the nonprogrammable random oracle model (such as the proof of OAEP [6, 43] ) can be seen as type-(b) proofs.
Applicability of Our Impossibility Proofs
Roughly, Theorem 1 says that no relativizing (and thus no black-box) reductions for the SIM-SO-COM security of certain commitment schemes exist. In fact, going through the proof shows that this covers type-(b) reductions as above. Technically, a type-(b) reduction simply assumes another oracle that models the trusted setup information available to all parties. This oracle can be viewed as part of the computational assumption, which is already modeled as an oracle in the proof of Theorem 1.
However, things lie differently for type-(a) reductions. In a type-(a) reduction, the simulator S expects to actively modify the setup information. As a consequence, S may violate the binding property of the considered commitment scheme. (In fact, this is precisely what the simulators for the SIM-SO-COM secure commitments with trusted setup sketched above would do in order to put up a successful simulation.) On the other hand, our proof of Theorem 1 uses that the commitment scheme is binding even to S. (More concretely, this is used in the proof of Lemma 3, when event bad coll is shown to occur only with negligible probability.) Hence the proof of Theorem 1 fails relative to a trusted setup and type-(a) simulators.
Application to Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems

Graph 3-Coloring Is Composable in Parallel
Overview Dwork et al. [22] have considered the applications of SIM-SO-COM secure commitment schemes to zero-knowledge protocols, in particular to the graph 3-coloring interactive proof system G3C of Goldreich et al. [28] . Concretely, [22, Theorem 7.6] states that G3C, when instantiated with a SIM-SO-COM secure commitment scheme, retains a relaxed zero-knowledge property called "S(V , T , D) zero-knowledge" under parallel composition. S(V , T , D) zero-knowledge is a variant of zero-knowledge in which the simulator S may depend on the verifier V , on the distinguisher T between real and simulated transcript, and on the considered message distribution D. Unfortunately, [22] could not give a SIM-SO-COM secure commitment scheme to implement their theorem.
Using our scheme ZKCom, we can instantiate and in fact generalize [22, Theorem 7.6]. Concretely, using a refined analysis and the specific structure of ZKCom, we show that G3C, when implemented with ZKCom, is zero-knowledge under parallel composition. This result does not contradict the negative composability results of Goldreich and Krawczyk [27] and Canetti et al. [13] . Namely, on the one hand, we use non-black-box techniques, similar to Barak [1] . On the other hand, our construction of ZKCom already assumes a concurrently composable zero-knowledge proof system. Hence, while our result does not immediately yield an efficient instantiation of G3C, it shows that there is hope for realizing G3C in a composable way.
A detailed technical treatment follows.
Commit-Choose-Open Protocols
We can actually prove parallel composability of a larger class of "commit-choose-open"-style interactive argument systems:
be an interactive argument system for an NP-language L with witness relation R. Let n = n(k) > 0 be polynomially bounded, and let I = (I n ) n be a family of sets such that each I n is a set of subsets of [n]. We say that IP is a commit-choose-open (CCO) protocol (that uses commitment scheme Com) if the following holds. First, we require that IP is of the following form:
, 2. P engages in n instances of Com to commit to the M i at R, 3. V, upon input x, chooses a subset I ∈ I n and sends I to P, 4. P opens all Com-commitments to M i with i ∈ I , 5. V accepts if the openings are valid and if the opened values satisfy some fixed relation specified by the protocol.
Second, we require that the messages M I opened by P in the third step are uniform and independent values over their respective domain. (In particular, M I can be efficiently sampled without knowing a witness w.)
It is easy to verify that the mentioned graph 3-coloring protocol G3C [28] is a CCO protocol. Also, trivially, the parallel composition of many instances of a CCO protocol is again a CCO protocol. In particular, in the following, we will for simplicity only talk about a single CCO protocol, while one should actually have the parallel composition of, e.g., G3C in mind.
Auxiliary-Input SIM-SO-COM Security
We will prove that any CCO protocol, when using a commitment scheme which is simulatable under selective openings, is black-box zero-knowledge. To this end, we need a refinement of SIM-SO-COM security which captures auxiliary input and an order of quantifiers as in the zero-knowledge definition.
Definition 12 (AI-SIM-SO-COM). In the situation of Definition 8, we say that Com is AI-SIM-SO-COM secure iff for every PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT simulator S such that for every PPT relation R, every PPT n-message distribution M, and all auxiliary inputs The following theorem is a generalization of Dwork et al. [22] , Theorem 7.6: Theorem 6 (AI-SIM-SO-COM implies zero-knowledge). Let IP = (P, V) be a CCO protocol that uses a commitment scheme Com that is AI-SIM-SO-COM secure for n and I as used in IP. Then IP is zero-knowledge in the sense of Definition 4.
Proof. Assume V * , (x, w), D, z V * , and z D as in Definition 4. We will construct a suitable PPT simulator S * . Since IP is a CCO protocol, we can immediately use the AI-SIM-SO-COM security of Com. To this end, we define an adversary A, a message distribution M, a relation R, and auxiliary inputs z A and z R as in Definition 12.
Concretely, define z M = (x, w) and let M be the PPT n-message distribution induced by P on input (x, w). Furthermore, let z A = (x k , z V * ), and let A = V * , except that A finally outputs a transcript of its conversation. We hence have out 
is negligible, where out S is the final output of S in the ideal AI-SIM-SO-COM experiment. Note that out S is still obtained through an interactive experiment that in particular requires knowledge about M and hence the witness w. However, the only information S actually receives about the message vector M is the subset M I . Since IP is a CCO protocol in the sense of Definition 11, M I is statistically independent of (x, w). Hence we can construct the following machine S * which has oracle access to A = V * . Namely, S * internally simulates S (and relays to S * its own oracle access to A). As soon as S outputs a set I , S * answers with a uniformly and independently sampled set M I . Note that S * no longer takes part in an AI-SIM-SO-COM experiment but instead works with input z A = (x k , z V * ) and oracle access to V * alone. By the CCO property of IP, we obtain Observing that the mentioned graph 3-coloring protocol G3C from Goldreich et al. [28] is a CCO protocol and that the set of CCO protocols is closed under parallel composition, we get: Corollary 3 (G3C is composable in parallel). The graph 3-coloring protocol G3C, when implemented with our commitment scheme ZKCom, is zero-knowledge, even under parallel composition.
IND-SO-COM Security and Witness Indistinguishability
Overview A natural question is whether IND-SO-COM security, our relaxation of SIM-SO-COM security, provides a reasonable fallback for SIM-SO-COM security. Now first, our results show that even when using IND-SO-COM secure schemes, we cannot rely on perfectly binding commitment schemes because of Theorem 3. For many interesting interactive proofs (and in particular the mentioned graph 3-coloring protocol G3C), this unfortunately means that the proof system degrades to an argument system. But, assuming we are willing to pay this price, what do we get from IND-SO-COM security?
The answer is "essentially witness indistinguishability." Namely, any commitment scheme which satisfies (a slight variation of) IND-SO-COM security can be used to implement commit-choose-open-style interactive argument systems. The resulting argument system will be witness-indistinguishable, and the security reduction is tight.
(In particular, the security reduction does not lose a factor of |I|, where |I| is the number of possible challenges sent by the verifier.)
We stress that, since the set of commit-choose-open protocols is closed under parallel composition, we get composability "for free." Now witness indistinguishable argument systems already enjoy a composition theorem (see Feige and Shamir [24] or Goldreich [26, Lemma 4.6.6]), so the compositionality claim is not surprising. However, we believe that our results demonstrate that the security notion of IND-SO-COM secure commitments itself is a reasonable fallback to SIM-SO-COM security.
We proceed to provide details.
Witness Indistinguishability
We first recall the definition of witness indistinguishability (a relaxation of zero-knowledge) from Feige and Shamir [24] , where we chose a slightly different but equivalent formulation: 
Auxiliary-Input IND-SO-COM Security
Since the standard definition of witness indistinguishability (see Definition 13) involves an auxiliary input z given to the verifier/adversary V * , we also consider a variation of Definition 10 that involves auxiliary input. Namely: Proof. Assume arbitrary x, w 0 , w 1 , V * , D, z as in Definition 13. We construct a message distribution M, an adversary A, and a z such that On the other hand, in the ideal IND-SO-COM experiment, the message M * n +1 that A receives from the experiment results from a resampling of M, conditioned on M * I = M I . Since IP is a CCO protocol, M I is independent of the used witness. Hence M I is also independent of b, and so M * n +1 will be a freshly tossed coin. We get Putting things together proves the theorem.
Tightness in the Reduction and Composition
We stress that we only lose a factor of 2 in our security reduction, which contrasts the loss of a factor of about n 2 in the proof of Goldreich et al. [28] . Their proof works also for perfectly binding commitment schemes (thus achieving an interactive proof system), which we (almost) cannot hope to satisfy AI-IND-SO-COM security, according to Theorem 3. However, since we can instantiate AI-IND-SO-COM secure schemes for arbitrary parameters n and I, we can hope to apply Theorem 7 even to protocols where |I n | is super-polynomial. 17 In particular, we can apply our theorem to a parallel composition of a CCO protocol (which is again a CCO protocol). This gives a composition theorem for the witness indistinguishability of CCO protocols (implemented with AI-IND-SO-COM secure commitments) at virtually no extra cost.
What Our Positive Results Do Not Imply (and What Our Negative Results Do Imply)
We emphasize as well that our results do not imply that there are no, in the terminology of [22] , "magic functions." In order to prove nonexistence of magic functions with [22, Theorem 5.1], one would have to find a noninteractive SIM-SO-COM secure commitment scheme. Our negative result, Theorem 1, states that this will not be possible with black-box reductions to standard assumptions.
a message distribution M and send this distribution (as a description of a PPT algorithm M) to P. experiment with A, depending on an internal coin toss (the output of P will then depend on A's output and on that coin toss). This P models Definition 10, in the sense that Also, using a truly random permutation as a basis, it is natural to assume that we can construct an ideal (i.e., as an oracle) perfectly binding commitment scheme X that satisfies P. (Note that although X is perfectly binding, A's view may still be almost statistically independent of the unopened messages, since the scheme X is given in oracle form.)
Hence, if the assumption essentially is already IND-SO-COM security, we can certainly achieve IND-SO-COM security (in particular, using a trivial reduction), and this seems to contradict Theorem 3. So where is the problem?
Resolving the Situation The problem in the above argument is that P-security (our assumption) implies IND-SO-COM security (our goal) in a fundamentally non-blackbox way. Namely, the proof converts an IND-SO-COM adversary A and a message distribution M into a P-adversary A that sends a description of M to P. This very step makes use of an explicit representation of the message distribution M, and this is what makes the whole proof non-black-box. In other words, this way of achieving IND-SO-COM security cannot be black-box, and there is no contradiction to our results.
Viewed from a different angle, the essence of our impossibility proofs is the following: build a very specific message distribution, based on oracles (RO, resp. C), such that another "breaking oracle" B "breaks" this message distribution if and only if the adversary can prove that he can open commitments. This step relies on the fact that we can specify message distributions which depend on oracles. Relative to such oracles, property P still holds (as we prove) but may not reflect IND-SO-COM security anymore. Namely, since P itself cannot access additional oracles, 18 P is also not able to sample a message space that depends on additional (i.e., on top of X ) oracles. So in our reduction, although A itself can, both in the IND-SO-COM experiment and when interacting with P, access all oracles, it will not be able to communicate a message distribution M that depends on additional oracles (on top of X ) to P. On the other hand, any PPT algorithm M, as formalized in Definition 10, can access all available oracles.
So for the above modeling of IND-SO-COM as a property P in the sense of Definition 9, our impossibility results still hold but become meaningless (since basically using property P makes the proof non-black-box). In a certain sense, this comes from the fact that the modeling of IND-SO-COM as a property P is inherently non-black-box. A similar argument holds for the message distribution in the SIM-SO-COM experiment; there, however, we face the additional problem of modeling the existence of a simulator in a property.
